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Abstract
Internet auctions are an attractive mechanism for the exchange of goods at a non-ﬁxed price point. The
operation of these auctions can be run under a variety of parameters. In this paper, we provide a theoretical
analysis of ﬁxed time forward auctions in cases where a single bid or multiple bids are accepted in a single
auction. A comparison of the economic beneﬁts and the corresponding buyer and seller surpluses between
the auctions where a single bid is accepted and the auctions where multiple bids are accepted is made. These
models are veriﬁed through systematic simulation experiments, based on a series of operational assumptions,
which characterise the arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers
are sampled. Decision rules for optimising surplus under diﬀerent auction fee structures are also given.
Keywords: Online Auctions, Internet Auctions, Auction Income, Auction Duration, Multiple Bids.
1 Introduction and Related Work
The prevalence of the Internet has ushered in the friction-less dissemination of data,
though, in more recent times, this free and centralised information is increasingly
being monetised and distributed. The use of Internet auctions has become the
prominent method of exchanging goods between consumers due to the primary
advantage that it aﬀords: the selling of goods of unknown value for which a variable
price-point model is advantageous. In this paper, we i) develop mathematical models
and characterise the properties of diﬀerent algorithms that may be found in or
may be built into Internet auction mechanisms, basing these models on a series of
operational assumptions including the arrival rate of bids as well as the distribution
from which the private values of buyers are sampled, and ii) construct and run
simulation experiments in the context of the mathematical models, checking the
validity of the mathematical models and using the same assumptions.
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Although this paper addresses the ﬁxed time forward auction, which is the type
of auction used by eBay, as well as auctions where two or more bids being accepted
in a single auction, this is only a subset of the auctions available to buyers and
sellers on the Internet. The sheer size and volume of the buyer and seller markets
means that there is ample supply and demand for the markets to be eﬃcient. Other
auctions include timeshift auctions [1] where there is a initial bidding period where
all buyers can participate in, and a second exclusive period where buyers can only
participate in if they have submitted a bid previously. This removes the advantage
caused by sniping, which see bidders submit their bids moments before the close of
an auction preventing other bidders from submitting counter-bids [2]. Another type
of auction is the penny auction, e.g. www.swoopo.co.uk, where bids are bought and
placed on items. There is a small window of time (usually 5 seconds) after each bid,
which will see the latest bid win the product at a nominal price if no-one places a
bid during that window. If there is activity, however, the timer is reset.
While many eBay users believe sniping to be problematic, eBay has always
maintained the policy that a bidder should bid his private value. Since the winner
pays the second price, there is little reason for a bidder to shade his bid. In order to
counteract sniping, other online auction websites, such as Amazon, have employed
auctions with a soft close, automatically extending the length of the auction. The
investigation of diﬀerent types of auction terminations has been undertaken in [3],
where it is found that late bidders of eBay type of hard close tend to be associated
with highly experienced bidders, whereas those of Amazon type tend to be relatively
inexperienced bidders. In [4], it is found that sniping often leads to winning, and it
observes that many sellers tend to set the starting bid price unrealistically low to
stimulate bidder participation.
The Independent Private Values model is often associated with auctions [5].
The characteristics of this model include the assumptions of privacy and indepen-
dence where the value of the commodity in question is private to the individual
buyers, and that diﬀerent buyers do not know the values other buyers attached to
the commodity. In addition, these values are drawn from a common distribution
which is known to the buyers. In probabilistic terms, this essentially amounts to
a series of values which are independent and identically distributed. Experimental
studies of Internet auction behaviour have been undertaken in [6,7,8]. In [8], it
concentrates on the Dutch auction and ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction formats, using
laboratory experiments and human subjects, where values are drawn from the uni-
form distribution between 0 and 100, focusing primarily on the eﬀect of clock speed
on sellers revenue. In our subsequently analysis, we shall follow the independent
private values model using the uniform distribution. Here we assume the bids {Qk}
to be ascending ordered values taken from the uniform distribution over the interval
(0, L), and that, as in [9], we assume that the bids arrive over time in a Poisson
manner with rate λ.
Price variation characteristics and consumer surplus are studied in [10,11]. The
work is extended in this paper, particularly using the seller surplus to calculate the
appropriate trade-oﬀ between time and money for auctions that accept two or more
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bids in a single auction. The ﬁeld of Internet auctions is broad and can range from
statistical analysis involving the use of various types of curves for ﬁtting price data
[12] to empirical investigations [13] where eBay auctions of coins are conducted.
It makes use of regression models to estimate the price of items and examines the
inﬂuence of seller ratings (which measures the reliability and services provided by
the seller) on the ﬁnal price. It has also found that the eﬀect of positive and negative
ratings is not symmetrical, with the latter having a much greater (adverse) inﬂuence
on the price. This will be addressed in future work. It also suggests that longer
auctions tend to have a beneﬁcial eﬀect in achieving a higher price.
In this paper, we describe the economic beneﬁts to buyers and sellers when there
are multiple identical lots available for sale and when multiple bids are accepted in
an auction. In Section 2, a stochastic framework for analysing Internet auctions is
described, which is then extended to include multiple accepted bids from an auction.
Section 3 introduces the concept of allocative eﬃciency, using the buyer and seller
surpluses to compare the performance of a multiple accepted bid auction with that
of a singularly accepted bid auction. Finally, these theoretical ﬁndings are veriﬁed
by way of simulation in Section 4, and the conclusions presented in Section 5.
2 Basic Stochastic Model of Internet Auctions
If there are N bids, we denote these ordered values by Q(1) < Q(2) < . . . < Q(N). A
forward auction is an electronic auction where buyers compete for items or services,
with the price going up over time, and the items or services for sale are displayed and
speciﬁed in a particular website (e.g. uBid.com). In the present model, we assume
that the auction time is ﬁxed with duration T . LetN be the number of bids received,
and the largest bid Q(N) received over the time interval (0, T ) is accepted. A high
value for T will produce a larger average accepted bid but the auction duration will
be longer. For practical meaningful auction operation, T should be signiﬁcantly
greater than the mean bid inter-arrival time 1/λ, i.e. T  1/λ. At the close of
the auction, the auctioning mechanism will select the maximum bid Q(N) to be
accepted. The exact algorithm is shown in Figure 1.
From the results of order statistics, it can be shown [14] that the conditional
income per auction is
E[Q(N)|Number of bids = N ] =
NL
N + 1
. (1)
Since
dE[Q(N)|Number of bids = N ]
dN
=
L
(N + 1)2
> 0, (2)
we see that, as the number of bids N increases, the corresponding average income
per auction will also increase. To determine the average income E[Q(N)], we remove
the condition on N in Equation 1 using the Poisson probabilities; i.e.
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begin
L = 0;
accept_id = null;
while clock < T do
begin
for an arriving bid of magnitude R,
if L < R, then do
begin
L = R;
accept_id = bidder_id;
end;
end;
return bid L offered by accept_id;
end;
Fig. 1. Fixed time forward auction.
E[Q(N)]
=
∞∑
N=1
NL
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
[
L− L
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
∞∑
N=1
L× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
−
∞∑
N=1
L
N + 1
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=L
(
1− e−λT
)
− Le
−λT
λT
∞∑
N=1
(λT )N+1
(N + 1)!
=L
(
1− e−λT
)
− Le
−λT
λT
(
eλT − 1− λT
)
. (3)
We omit the term N = 0 in the above, since when N = 0, the income will be
zero. This gives an average income per auction of
E[Q(N)] =
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
, (4)
and an income rate, i.e. income per unit time, of
L
λT 2
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
. (5)
Figure 2 shows E[Q(N)] for diﬀerent values of λ for L = 100, and T = 10. We
see that the increase in bid rate up to λ = 4 produces rather steep average auction
income improvement. There seems to be a critical bid rate at around λ = 6, above
which the improvement in income becomes less pronounced.
Figure 3 shows the rate of income for λ = 1 and L = 100 for diﬀerent values
of the auction duration T . We see that the income rate favours short duration
auctions, which tends to stabilise for T > 10, beyond which varying the auction
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Fig. 2. Auction income as a function of the bid rate.
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Fig. 3. Auction income per unit time as a function of the auction duration.
duration will not bring about any signiﬁcant change in the income rate. Figure 4
shows the expected transaction price for λ = 1, L = 100 for diﬀerent values of the
auction duration T . We see that it follows much the same shape as Figure 2.
Indeed, since both λ and T occur together in Equation 4, this is what we would
expect. Letting z = λT , we have
E[QN ] =
L
z
(
z + e−z − 1) , (6)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to z, we have
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Fig. 4. Auction income as a function of the auction duration.
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dz
=
L
z2
(
1− e−z − ze−z)
=
L
z2
[
1− 1 + z
ez
]
.
Since z > 0, and
ez =1 + z +
z2
2!
+ . . . ,
we have (1 + z) < ez, so that (1 + z)/ez < 1, and thus
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dz
=
L
z2
[
1− 1 + z
ez
]
> 0. (7)
Consequently, we have
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dλ
=
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dz
× dz
dλ
= T × dE
[
Q(N)
]
dz
> 0.
Likewise, we have
dE
[
Q(N)
]
dT
= λ× dE
[
Q(N)
]
dz
> 0. (8)
Thus, the transaction price can be increased by either increasing the bid rate or
the auction duration. As we shall see later, since the auction duration is controlled
by the seller, he/she can use the auction duration as a mechanism for raising his/her
surplus.
It is interesting to compare the auction income using an approximation based on
Equation 1. If we remove the condition on N by simply replacing N by its average
(from the Poisson distribution) of z = λT , we have approximately
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E
[
Q(N)
]
=
Lz
z + 1
. (9)
Figure 5 compares the average auction income from Equations 6 and 9 for L =
100 for diﬀerent values of z = λT , and we note that for λ = 1, we have z = T .
We see that the approximation is quite good for moderate to large values of z. For
very large values of z  1, the exact formula and the approximation are virtually
indistinguishable, and we shall be making use of this approximation to obtain closed-
form solutions in the surplus analysis below.
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Fig. 5. Auction income as a function of the auction duration with a comparison of exact analysis (Equation
6 ) and approximation (Equation 9) solutions.
3 Surplus Analysis
The concept of allocative eﬃciency (or sometimes called operational eﬃciency) is
often employed to evaluate how Internet auctions perform [7]. The seller surplus
is the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the seller’s costs (sometimes
generically called production cost), while the diﬀerence between the buyer’s value
and the transaction price gives the buyer surplus or consumer surplus (see Figure
6). The total surplus is the seller surplus plus the buyer surplus, and the allocative
eﬃciency is given by the total actual realised surplus expressed as a fraction of the
total possible surplus [7]. For simplicity, these quantities are represented in Figure
6 as linear functions, but the ideas remain the same if one or more of these are
non-linear.
From the buyers’ point of view, their valuation of the auction item is indicated
by the maximum price L that they are willing to pay. Thus the buyer surplus β is
given by the diﬀerence in buyer valuation and the transaction price, which is
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Fig. 6. Measures of auction surpluses.
β =L− L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
=
L
λT
(
1− e−λT
)
=
L
z
(
1− e−z) > 0.
Since z = λT is the average number of bids, the above can be interpreted as
follows: the consumer surplus is the private value evenly divided by the number of
bids times the probability of having a non-empty auction (i.e. an auction where
there is at least one bid). We also see that the higher the value of L, the greater is
the buyer surplus. On the other hand, bidder collusion behaviour — where bidders
collude in order to lower the transaction price — may be incorporated by having
a lower value of L. Shilling behaviour — where the seller artiﬁcially inﬂates the
transaction price through disguising as bidders — may be reﬂected by a higher value
for λ, and hence a higher value for z = λT , which from Equation 7, will result in a
higher transaction price and consequently reducing the buyer surplus while raising
the seller surplus.
From the seller’s point of view, the aim of auction is to attain improvements
in seller surplus through expending more time to achieve a higher price or income.
If one simply accepts the ﬁrst bid that comes along, then its average magnitude is
E [Qi] = L/2. By holding an auction, the average gain in surplus per bid acceptance
due to one auction, assuming there are N bids, is
E
[
Q(N)|N
]− E [Qi|N ] = LN
N + 1
− L
2
=
(N − 1)L
2(N + 1)
. (10)
If there are two or more identical items for sale, to speed things up one might
accept the two highest bids, instead of the just the highest one. Accepting more than
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one bid per auction is quite common in Internet auctions; e.g. Google’s ad auctions
often accept several bids. From [14], it is shown that the k-th order statistic of N
samples from a uniform distribution distributed over a given interval is k/(N + 1)
of the length of the interval. Thus, in accepting the two highest bids in one auction,
the average gain in seller surplus per bid acceptance is
1
2
{(
E
[
Q(N)|N
]− E [Qi|N ])+ (E [Q(N−1)|N]− E [Qi|N ])}
=
1
2
(
E
[
Q(N)|N
]− E [Q(N−1)|N])− E [Qi|N ]
=
1
2
[
LN
N + 1
+
N − 1
N + 1
]
− L
2
=
(N − 2)L
2(N + 1)
,
which is less than the gain in seller surplus in the case where only one bid is accepted,
but it takes only one instead of two auction times and associated costs to achieve
two acceptances. Correspondingly, the average buyer surplus will increase, since
the transaction price of the second item is lower.
In general, the average of the highest K bids, given there are N bids, is
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
=
L
K
K−1∑
j=0
N − j
N + 1
=
(2N −K + 1)L
2(N + 1)
. (11)
Thus, the conditional average gain in surplus per acceptance is
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
{
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]− E [Qi|N ]}
=
1
K
⎧⎨
⎩
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
⎫⎬
⎭− E [Qi|N ]
=
1
K
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(j)|N
]− L
2
=
(2N −K + 1)L
2(N + 1)
− L
2
=
(N −K)L
2(N + 1)
,
which from Equation 10 is always below the gain in surplus resulting from accepting
a single bid per auction. The average total income in accepting the top K bids,
from Equation 11, is
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
=
(2N −K + 1)LK
2(N + 1)
. (12)
T.L.Y. Leung, W.J. Knottenbelt / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 275 (2011) 105–121 113
Consider a variation of the basic model, in which theK highest bids are accepted
in one auction. Note that accepting K highest bids requires that there are at least
K arrivals (and of course at least K items for sale), and for meaningful operation,
this requires that T  K × Mean Inter-arrival Time or λT  K. Removing the
condition on N , and noting that N ≥ K, we have, for the average total income in
accepting the top K bids,
K−1∑
j=0
E
[
Q(N−j)|N
]
=
∞∑
N=K
LK(2N −K + 1)
2(N + 1)
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=
LK
2
∞∑
N=K
[
2− K + 1
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N
N !
=LK
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N
N !
− LK
2λT
∞∑
N=K
[
K + 1
N + 1
]
× e
−λT (λT )N+1
N !
=LK
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N
N !
− LK(K + 1)
2λT
∞∑
N=K
e−λT (λT )N+1
N !
=LK
⎧⎨
⎩1−
K−1∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
⎫⎬
⎭−
LK(K + 1)
2λT
⎧⎨
⎩1−
K∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
⎫⎬
⎭ .
That is, we have for the expected income IK when we choose to accept K top
bids in a single auction
IK =LK
⎧⎨
⎩1−
K−1∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
⎫⎬
⎭−
LK(K + 1)
2λT
⎧⎨
⎩1−
K∑
j=0
e−λT (λT )j
j!
⎫⎬
⎭ .
We see that for K = 1, the above reduces to Equation 5, and for the important
special case K = 2, we have
I2=
L
λT
(
2λT + λTe−λT − (λT )
2e−λT
2
+ 3e−λT − 3
)
. (13)
Consider the cost Ω of holding an auction, which may be related to the auction
time and associated costs such as fees paid to the auction site, and payments to
ﬁnancial intermediaries. We assume that these costs are otherwise not incurred if
the item is sold through other channels. Let the price of a unit of the good be C. If
no auctions are held, then the expected seller surplus would simply be (L/2 − C),
where, as indicated from the arguments above, L/2 represents the average value of
the ﬁrst oﬀer, and we assume that it will be accepted. By holding an auction, the
seller surplus S becomes
S =
L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− (C +Ω).
Thus, the break-even point of holding an auction is given by the improvement
in surplus oﬀset by the auction cost
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LλT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− L
2
= Ω.
As shown in Equation 8 above, the longer the auction, the higher the expected
income. Supposing one wishes to attain a certain level of seller surplus So, then the
minimal auction duration T ∗ is given by the solution to the following equation
S0=
L
λT ∗
(
λT ∗ + e−λT
∗ − 1
)
− (C +Ω). (14)
While we may solve for the above using numerical methods, we may obtain
closed-form solutions by using the approximation from the previous section. Using
this approximation, the above becomes
S0=
Lz′
z′ + 1
− (C +Ω),
giving
z′ =
S0 + C +Ω
L− (S0 + C +Ω) ,
and this will provide a reasonable approximation for z′  1. Thus, the approximate
optimal auction duration T ′ is
T ′ =
S0 + C +Ω
λ [L− (S0 + C +Ω)] ,
Letting S0+C+Ω = 90, L = 100, and λ = 1, and numerically solving Equation
14 provides the exact minimum T ∗ in order to achieve a minimum surplus of S0
which in this case is found to be T ∗ = 10 (see Figure 7). As can be seen from Figure
7, any value of T > 10 will yield at least a surplus of S0. The corresponding ap-
proximate solution gives T ′ = 90/(100−90) = 9, which yields an error of just under
10%. From the sellers point of view, in order to quickly determine the optimal T ∗,
while avoiding the elaborate procedure of ﬁnding a numerical solution to Equation
14, one can simply ﬁrst solve for T ′, and then add a safety factor to ensure that
the resultant surplus ≥ S0 , which in the present case may be 10%. A higher safety
factor may be used to ensure greater certainty of achieving the required level of
minimum surplus.
Next, the overall surplus in accepting K bids per auction is
IK −KC − Ω
While the overall surplus in selling K items through K separate auctions would
be
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
−K(C +Ω).
Thus, it would be more proﬁtable to sell K items in K separate auctions instead
of selling them in a single auction if the expected surplus of the latter is higher, i.e.
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
−K(C +Ω)> IK −KC − Ω
or
LK
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− (K − 1)Ω> IK
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Fig. 7. Numerical determination of optimal auction duration.
For the important special case K = 2, the above becomes
2L
λT
(
λT + e−λT − 1
)
− Ω> I2
and making use of Equation 13, this condition simpliﬁes to
ez
(
1− zΩ
L
)
> 1 + z − z
2
2
.
We see that in terms of magnitude, the left hand side increases exponentially
in z, while the right hand side increases quadratically. Thus, for suﬃciently large
z, the left hand side will go negative with a large magnitude, while the right hand
side will also go negative with a comparatively smaller magnitude; consequently the
above inequality will not hold for large z. Thus, when the number of bids is large,
it is always preferable to sell the items in single auctions.
Sometimes, the auction fee structure is such that the auction website would
charge for a certain percentage of the income payment, which for instance is the
common practice of eBay. Denoting by ξ such a percentage, then the overall surplus
in accepting K bids per auction is
(1− ξ)IK −KC.
In adopting the same approximation as before by suitably replacing N by λT ,
then from Equation 12, we have
IK  (2λT −K + 1)LK
2(λT + 1)
.
Using this approximation for the special case K = 2, we have
I2  (2λT − 1)L
λT + 1
,
so that the overall surplus is approximately
T.L.Y. Leung, W.J. Knottenbelt / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 275 (2011) 105–121116
L(1− ξ)(2λT − 1)
λT + 1
− 2C.
Thus it would be preferable to accept two bids per auction rather than to accept
a single bid in two separate auctions if
2(1− ξ)I1 − 2C < (1− ξ)I2 − 2C,
or,
2λTL
λT + 1
<
2λTL− L
λT + 1
,
which is never the case for L > 0. Thus, for this particular auction fee structure,
unlike the previous case, it would always be preferable to run two separate auctions
rather than a single auction given that the number of bids is large. In fact, even
when the number of bids is not large, the general validity of this choice can be seen
from Equation 12, where the total income from running a single auction is
(1− ξ)IK|N =
LK(1− ξ)(2N −K + 1)
2(N + 1)
,
where IK|N signiﬁes the total income conditioning on N . The corresponding quan-
tity in running K separate auctions is
KI1|N =
(1− ξ)NLK
N + 1
Thus, it is preferable to run separate auctions if
N
N + 1
>
2N −K + 1
2(N + 1)
which will be valid whenever K > 1. Thus, for this particular auction fee structure,
unlike the previous one, it is always more advantageous for the seller to sell the
items in separate auctions.
4 Simulation
To enable the comparison between observed and theoretical values and to validate
the mathematical models, an auction process simulator that implements the pseudo-
code for the auction algorithm, has been constructed in C++. In order to sample
values from the uniform and exponential distributions for the private value of bidders
and the rate of bids respectively, the Boost C++ Library is used. In particular, we
use the variate_generator with the uniform_01 and exponential_distribution
headers, which is implemented on top of the mersenne_twister psuedo-random
number generator. The result is outputted as a space-delimited text string that
states lambda, which is the incoming rate of bids and usually the variable we change,
the duration of that auction, and the revenue generated from that auction. Ten
thousand trials are run for each arrival rate, which is sampled in 0.01 intervals in
the units concerned over the desired interval.
Figures 8, 9 and 10 superimpose simulation data on Figures 2, 3 and 4, re-
spectively. The simulation is a validation of the theoretical results and from the
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close alignment of the theoretical and simulated curves, the simulation seems to
corroborate the above theory.
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Fig. 8. Simulated and theoretical auction income as a function of the bid rate.
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Auction duration (s)
10
20
30
40
50
60
Income per unit time
Simulated
Theoretical
Fig. 9. Simulated and theoretical auction income per unit time as a function of the auction duration.
Figure 11, plots Equation 13 and its theoretical counterpart, i.e. both the theo-
retical and simulated auction income for auctions where two bids are accepted. The
theoretical result is shown by the solid line, while the sample point in the simulation
are plotted using grey diamonds. Also included in the graph is a simulation of the
auction income derived from two auctions. This is used for comparison and the
trade-oﬀ between additional seller surplus and the auction taken twice as long is
up to the seller. The reason why the income derived from the theoretical result is
greater than that of the simulation is that the former assumes that there are always
two bids present, while in the simulation, this is not always the case (at λ = 1,
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Fig. 10. Simulated and theoretical auction income as a function of the auction duration.
and with the auction lasting 4 time units, there are an average of 4 bids arriving
in a given auction; the probability of 0 or 1 bid arriving during the entirety of the
auction is 0.09158 using the Poisson probabilities, a ﬁgure that is non-negligble).
Also of note is that if the seller were to sell directly to buyers, he would, on average,
receive an income of 50 per item or an income of 100 for two items; all the simulated
data points for accepting two bids per auction lie above this threshold.
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Fig. 11. Simulated and theoretical auction income for auctions that accept two bids per auction compared
with income gained from two separate auctions.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Closed-form expressions are obtained for the stochastic analysis of Internet auction
process presented in this paper, and key performance metrics of transaction price
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and auction income per unit time are derived. It is found that the auction income
critically depends on the number of competing bids, so that as the number of bids
increases, the auction income increases, and it climbs relatively sharply at the be-
ginning but gradually does so slowly, while the income rate tends to favour shorter
auctions. Both exact expressions and approximate formulae are given, with the
latter providing a good estimate when the number of bids is large.
Analysis of surplus for buyers and sellers in Internet auction processes are given,
and by suitably adjusting the diﬀerent parameters, bidder collusion and seller
shilling behaviours may be represented. Compared with other means and chan-
nels for the exchange of goods, the aim of the sellers selling items through auctions
is to increase the transaction price. Appropriately controlling the auction process
would be eﬀective in raising the surplus for the seller, who can optimise this by
adjusting the auction duration and the number of bids accepted per auction. The
exact optimal auction duration may be obtained through numerical methods, while
closed-form results are obtained for an approximate solution. Depending on the
auction fee structure and seller utility, it may sometimes be advantageous to ac-
cept two or more bids per auction. Throughout the analysis, it is found that the
average number of bids is key determinant of performance. Simulations have been
performed and close agreement with theoretical analysis is observed.
In future work, rather than simply validating the fee structure presented in
this paper against theoretical results, the model will be compared with real-world
data scraped from auction sites. This will also be conducted alongside other more
complex auction fee structures such as eBay’s auction listings which require both
an insertion fee for the listing according to the price bracket that the starting price
falls in, as well as ﬁnal value fees which subtract 10% from the winning bid with
the exception of mobile phones on contract and property. The ratings of sellers
— which relate to such factors as seller reputation, reliability, readiness to resolve
disputes and provide refunds, delivery eﬃciency as well as seller surplus — are
key considerations in Internet auctions and may also be incorporated into future
optimisation models.
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